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Chapter 9
Asking for Help: Survey and Experimental
Evidence on Financial Advice
and Behavior Change
Angela A. Hung and Joanne K. Yoong
As US policymakers focus on the difficult problem of increasing access to
unbiased financial advice in the context of self-directed retirement plans,
a key question is whether implementing potentially costly reforms and
regulations is likely to bring about the desired changes in behavior. This
chapter addresses two research questions: do individuals actually improve
their financial behavior in response to advice? And, if policymakers could
enhance the availability of neutral financial advice, would participants
actually seek and implement the advice given?
We present two complementary observational and experimental analyses
of investors and advice, relevant to 401(k) plans. In observational analyses,
we observe actual investment outcomes from real planholders, but our
inferences about the effect of advice are limited by two problems—
self-selection into advice, and reverse causality—that are not mutually
exclusive. In experimental analyses, we are restricted to hypothetical invest-
ment choices, but we can eliminate both selection and reverse causality. By
comparing and contrasting our results, we are able to draw on implications
from both approaches.
For policymakers, our lessons about advice are mixed. One key implica-
tion is that having employers offer advice as an elective and ensuring
employees’ active decision-making are likely to result in significant take-
up and some improvement of financial outcomes. Moreover, employees
with low financial literacy are more likely to take advantage of these pro-
grams. Yet going further, to make the provision of advisory services manda-
tory for every employee, may be extremely costly and achieve little
behavioral change. Furthermore, in some situations, policymakers have
recommended compulsory financial counseling as a remedy; our results
suggest this may not work unless recipients are prepared to take the advice.
In general, motivation is extremely challenging.
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Background
Interactions between individual investors and financial advisors have
changed considerably over the last few decades, as financial service pro-
viders have expanded their range of services and individuals have taken on
greater responsibility for their own financial well-being. At year-end 2011,
Americans held an estimated $9.4 trillion in employer-sponsored defined
contribution (DC) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) (ICI,
2012). Yet research in behavioral finance suggests that when left to their own
devices, investors often fail to make optimal investment decisions in their DC
plans. Instead, they tend touseheuristics or simpledecision rules tomake their
initial allocation decisions (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Benartzi and
Thaler, 2001; ICI, 2001; Hewitt Associates, 2004; Agnew and Szykman, 2005).
Investing ‘mistakes’ and simple rules of thumb can have significant welfare
implications, given that households may not invest according to optimal
portfolio choice theory (Dominitz andHung, 2008).1 Someof these ‘mistakes’
may be attributed to individuals’ lack of financial management skills: Lusardi
and Mitchell (2006, 2007) argue that investing is a complex undertaking
that requires consumers to gather, process, and project data on compound
interest, risk diversification, and inflation, as well as to accumulate knowledge
of the asset universe. Their findings suggest that most of the US population
is not sufficiently financially literate to cope with the shifting burden of post-
retirement planning to the individual.
In theory, financial advisors could ameliorate the negative consequences
of differential financial literacy, improving returns and ensuring greater risk
diversification among less sophisticated households (Hackethal et al., 2012;
Hackethal and Inderst, 2013). Indeed, using advisors allows households to
benefit from economies of scale in portfolio management and information
acquisition, because advisors can spread these costs among their clients. But
consumer advocates argue that investors who are unprepared tomake sound
decisions may also be most vulnerable to bad advice from affiliates of broker-
dealers or investment companies who benefit from advising them to buy
unsuitable products (Hung et al., 2008). Also, people who consult advisors
but do not follow through might not benefit from good advice, as their
knowledge may not translate into actual behavioral change.
Much attention has been paid to the pitfalls of bad investment advice.
The theoretical and empirical economics research literature on investment
advice has largely been concerned with moral hazard problems inherent in
the advisor–advisee relationship (see, e.g., Liu, 2005; Inderst and Ottaviani,
2009; Yoong and Hung, 2009; Hackethal et al., 2012; Turner and Muir,
2013). Similarly, regulatory and legislative debate related to self-directed
pension plans in the United States has focused on how best to mitigate the
risk of exposing unsophisticated plan participants to manipulation while
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still allowing access to advice. The Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006
facilitated provision by granting exemptions to DC plan providers under
level-fee compensation arrangements or for advice given by an unbiased
computer model.
Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, relatively little information exists
about whether good investment advice actually works. Although regulators
and legislators are deeply engaged in efforts to make financial advice more
accessible to the everyday investor in a neutral setting, the practical benefit
in terms of behavior change of achieving such a policy goal should not be
regarded as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, there is remarkably little
empirical evidence about individual responsiveness to financial advice
outside an environment with moral hazard.
A long-standing literature on general advice-taking and receiving is
rooted in psychology and organizational behavior. Findings on the propen-
sity to seek advice are mixed and highly context dependent: studies
find results that vary from resistance to advice-seeking, even if it is
free (Gibbons, 2003), or nearly universal advice-seeking (Gino, 2008).
Uncertainty about decisions, however, is found to predict advice-seeking
(Gibbons et al., 2003). Although it is difficult to draw conclusions about
when individuals seek advice, the research literature strongly suggests that
people who do solicit advice are more likely to follow that advice, compared
to those who receive unsolicited advice (Gibbons et al., 2003). Indeed, a
robust finding is that individuals who receive advice by default tend to
significantly discount it (Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b;
Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006). While explicitly solicited advice is perceived as
helpful, unsolicited advice or imposed support is perceived as intrusive and
can even lead to negative responses (Goldsmith and Fitch, 1997; Gold-
smith, 2000; Deelstra et al., 2003). In a similar vein, Gino (2008) shows that
individuals are significantly more receptive to advice they pay for, rather
than advice they get for free.
Few empirical analyses specifically address the context of investment
advice, particularly in a representative population. Much of the psychology-
based evidence has been gathered in a laboratory using tasks unrelated to
investment management. Moreover, it is difficult to extrapolate from the
experimental laboratory-based literature on financial incentives, as the
results are mixed: Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) and Sniezek et al. (2004)
find that financial incentives decrease advice discounting, but, by contrast,
Dalal (2001) finds the opposite. In the economics literature, evidence
suggests that although investors often say they desire more advice, it is
unclear how and when they implement the advice given (Helman et al.,
2007). Furthermore, since investors actively choose whether to seek advice,
correlations between actual behavior and advice may be the result of self-
selection: people particularly prone to certain types of investing behavior
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may also be more likely to seek out advisors. Hackethal et al. (2012) find
that self-selection largely explains better outcomes for advisees in the
context of German internet brokerage accounts, and they suggest a theory
of ‘babysitters,’ in which wealthy individuals outsource their financial man-
agement to others. Yet those online brokerage clients are likely to repre-
sent a population with experience and objectives that differ from the
average US DC planholder. Kramer (2012) also finds that portfolio alloca-
tions of Dutch investors vary with advice, but performance does not. While
some behavior in 401(k) plans such as trading activity has been found to be
correlated with advice (Agnew, 2006), a causal relationship has not yet
been well established.
Study setting
The primary data collection instrument for our investment behavior analyses
was a survey administered to 2,224 members of the RAND American Life
Panel (ALP).2 Our behavior survey was administered as wave MS73 of the
ALP between May 5, 2009, and June 22, 2009. For a subset of 1,467 individ-
uals, we can match our behavior survey to a previous module on financial
literacy used to compute an index of measured financial literacy as well as
an index of self-assessed financial literacy. The first index is computed
from respondents’ answers to questions related to basic numeracy skills
and knowledge of investments, retirement plans, and insurance, while the
second is based on respondents’ own judgments about their abilities. Details
of the construction of the indexes can be found in Hung et al. (2009).
Individuals from our panel who reported being enrolled in a current
employer’s DC plan were asked whether they had consulted a financial
advisor for individual recommendations regarding their DC plan. Table 9.1
shows the descriptive statistics of sample size and weighted demographic
composition for this group of 618 individuals.
The propensity to seek advice
In 2008, 18 percent3 of employees in our sample with DC plans consulted
an advisor. The breakdown by demographic composition shows that pro-
portionally, more women and minorities consulted an advisor in 2008
regarding their DC plan. Older, more educated and wealthier individuals
were also more likely to have consulted an advisor. We estimate a linear
probability (LP) model with reported advice-seeking in 2008 as the binary
outcome variable. In the LP model, the coefficients may be interpreted as
the best linear predictors (BLP) of changes in the probability of the
outcome associated with a unit change of each regressor.4 Column 1 of
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Table 9.2 shows that while the regression coefficients mirror the pattern
observed in the summary statistics, among the various demographic char-
acteristics, there are few statistically significant individual predictors of
actual reported advice-seeking in 2008 apart from marital status.
The relationship between advice and reported
DC plan behavior
Most DC planholders continued actively making contributions to their
plans in 2008, and slightly more than half of plan assets were held in
stock. But a large fraction of respondent portfolios featured at least one
common investment mistake. Although respondents report that they most
value advice for investing purposes, use of an advisor was not strongly
related to investment portfolio quality.
When asked about the value of advice in a DC plan setting, most respond-
ents (57 percent) placed the highest value on advice related to asset
allocation. About one-third considered setting overall contribution goals
most valuable, while only about one-quarter placed similar value on advice
related to future planning such as tax and estate planning or decumulation.
Table 9.1 Summary statistics: American Life Panel (ALP) data
Number of responses
Total ALP sample 2,224
Retired 498
Self-employed 185
Unemployed 287
Employer offers no retirement plan 293
Employer offers no DC plan or unknown 209
Employee is ineligible for plan 43
Employee is eligible but not enrolled 86
Missing/inconsistent status 5
Final sample: currently enrolled in DC 618
Weighted %
Female 48.7
College degree 45.7
Married 65.4
Age 45 41.2
Annual family income (AFI) <$50,000 23.1
Black or Hispanic 18.7
Note: The sample consists of respondents to our ALP module who are
current participants in DC plans (see text).
Source: Authors’ computations; see text.
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This suggests that many respondents look to advisors for specific tasks
related to investment management, rather than larger retirement plan
management issues. We therefore focus primarily on asset allocations
throughout this work and also describe contributions behavior briefly below.
Table 9.3 shows that on average, 55 percent of DC plan assets are held in
stock, 20 percent in bonds, and 20 percent in money market funds, with the
remaining 4 percent in other assets. Women, Blacks, and Hispanics hold
less stock, as do the less educated, older, and less wealthy respondents.
Following Mottola and Utkus (2009), we diagnose portfolio ‘mistakes’
based on commonly accepted principles of investment. These ‘mistakes’
are defined as follows: (a) holding a zero balance in equities, (b) holding
an equity balance of less than 40 percent (overly conservative), (c) holding
more than 95 percent equity (overly aggressive), and (d) holding a port-
folio that is 100 percent in a single asset class (under-diversified). More
than half (56 percent) of respondents’ portfolios are characterized by these
Table 9.2 Ordinary least squares estimates of the determinants of the propensity to
seek advice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Married 0.087** 0.036 0.035 0.071*
(0.044) (0.050) (0.048) (0.042)
Female 0.062 0.067 0.064 0.066
(0.044) (0.051) (0.050) (0.043)
Age <40 –0.020 0.059 0.059 –0.004
(0.044) (0.056) (0.056) (0.042)
AFI <$50,000 –0.039 –0.027 –0.029 –0.024
(0.051) (0.065) (0.068) (0.050)
Black or Hispanic 0.073 –0.014 –0.015 0.064
(0.079) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076)
College degree 0.024 0.012 0.015 0.012
(0.043) (0.051) (0.047) (0.043)
Measured financial literacy –0.003
(0.034)
Self-assessed financial literacy –0.008
(0.033)
Net plan losses (2008) 0.132**
(0.055)
Constant 0.085* 0.108* 0.130
(0.048) (0.056) (0.113)
N 590 450 450 590
R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance of differences are within
the two categories, where * indicates significant at the 10 percent level, ** is significant at
5 percent, and *** is significant at 1 percent. See Table 9.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the American Life Panel 2009; see text.
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‘mistakes.’ Women tend to be more conservative, holding less equity, and
they tend to be less well diversified. Indeed, more than 12 percent of
female respondents hold no equity at all. Similarly, older, less wealthy,
and less educated individuals hold no stocks, precluding longer-term
asset growth. Table 9.3 also shows that individuals who use advisors invest
less in stocks andmore in bonds, and they also hold fewer assets outside the
category of stocks, bonds, and money market funds. They tend not to be
Table 9.3 Portfolio allocation patterns of current defined contribution (DC)
planholders
Panel A. Portfolio characteristics
Stocks (%) Bonds (%) Money market (%) Other (%) N
Male 60.0 18.0 19.1 2.9 503
Female 49.9 24.1 21.8 4.2 503
No college degree 52.3 21.4 22.8 3.5 503
College degree 58.5 20.4 17.6 3.6 503
Age <45 59.1 19.6 17.8 3.4 503
Age 45 52.4 21.8 22.2 3.6 503
AFI <$50,000 48.5 19.2 28.1 4.1 503
AFI $50,000 56.8 21.3 18.5 3.4 503
Black or Hispanic 52.0 16.8 28.2 3.0 503
Total 55.2 20.9 20.4 3.5 503
No advisor 55.5 20.4 20.4 3.7 478
Advisor 52.5 24.0 20.0 2.6 478
Panel B. ‘Mistakes’ in reported portfolio allocations
Zero equity
(%)
Under diversified
(%)
Too aggressive
(%)
Too conservative
(%)
N
Male 6.4 25.6 22.9 26.2 503
Female 12.4 30.1 20.7 42.2 503
No college
degree
11.4 34.0 24.8 40.1 503
College degree 6.8 20.5 18.4 26.7 503
Age <45 6.5 26.5 22.9 31.3 503
Age 45 11.3 28.6 21.1 35.7 503
AFI <$50,000 13.1 27.7 17.5 40.9 503
AFI $50,000 8.3 27.7 22.9 32.1 503
Black or
Hispanic
8.2 29.6 25.1 43.0 503
Total 9.3 27.7 21.8 33.9 503
No advisor 9.2 27.3 22.1 33.9 478
Advisor 7.8 23.6 17.1 36.6 478
Note : See Table 9.1.
Source: Authors’ computations using the American Life Panel 2009.
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very aggressive, and they are less or equally likely to hold zero equities. Also,
they are prone to being too conservative.
To examine the magnitude and significance of differences while control-
ling for potential demographic effects, we use ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression to estimate a set of equations of the form:
Yi ¼ aþ b advicei þ X 0i dþ  ð9:1Þ
using alternative behaviors of interest as the outcome variables Y. In addition
to a vector of demographic characteristics, X, we now include an indicator
for advice as an explanatory variable. When the behavior of interest is a
binary variable, the results are interpreted as an LP model, as before.
The multivariate regression (Table 9.4) yields results very similar to the
trends in the summary tables, consistent with the finding that these demo-
graphic characteristics do not generally predict actual reported advice-seeking
in 2008. Advice is not statistically significantly predictive of allocation levels or
investment ‘mistakes’ within portfolios.
Contributions behavior also shows a mixed relationship to advice. In this
sample, 88 percent of respondents eligible to contribute to their DC plan in
2007 and 2008 reported making a contribution and the average percentage
contribution is above 7 percent, although this average is skewed by a small
number of extremely high reported percentages. The median and modal
value of the distribution is 5 percent. Twenty-two percent of respondents
reported increasing their contributions since 2007, and 80 percent of those
who were offered an employer match met the match amount. On the other
hand, 9 percent reported either decreasing or stopping contributions in
2008, and 9.6 percent took an early withdrawal.5 Both simple tabulations of
the data and similar multivariate regression analysis reveal that individuals
with advisors were somewhat more likely to make contributions in 2007 and
2008, and to meet their employer match. However, the data also show that
those who received advice were more likely to have reduced their 2008
contribution relative to 2007.6
Does self-selection on financial literacy explain
the advice–behavior relationship?
Researchers have argued that financial literacy is a key unobservable char-
acteristic that often complicates analyses of advice, and vice versa. Theoret-
ical arguments about the relationship between advice and behavior go in
both directions. If financial literacy substitutes for advice and the least
financially literate are more likely to take up advice, differences in observed
behavior may understate the positive impact of advice. Conversely, if the
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Table 9.4 Ordinary least squares parameter estimates
Panel A. Empirical determinants of portfolio allocations by DC planholders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stocks Bonds Money market Other
Consulted advisor in 2008 –2.226 4.233 –0.772 –1.234
(5.424) (3.311) (3.840) (1.190)
Married 3.065 –4.002 1.211 –0.274
(5.469) (3.871) (4.839) (1.461)
Female –6.666 4.352 1.387 0.927
(4.572) (2.860) (3.638) (1.341)
Age <45 6.027 –1.365 –4.697 0.035
(4.107) (2.554) (3.193) (1.279)
AFI <$50,000 –2.846 –3.752 6.939 –0.340
(5.437) (3.610) (5.080) (1.703)
Black or Hispanic –4.578 –6.041 10.673** –0.055
(6.070) (3.739) (5.364) (2.028)
College degree 7.021* –1.205 –5.999* 0.183
(4.201) (2.842) (3.569) (1.393)
Constant 51.766*** 23.732*** 21.045*** 3.456*
(7.254) (5.134) (6.423) (1.852)
N 478 478 478 478
R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00
Panel B. ‘Mistakes’ in reported portfolio allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zero equity Under-diversified Too aggressive Too conservative
Consulted –0.012 –0.041 –0.057 0.007
advisor in 2008 (0.037) (0.071) (0.072) (0.079)
Married –0.015 0.030 0.038 –0.038
(0.051) (0.074) (0.069) (0.072)
Female 0.041 0.075 0.023 0.136**
(0.037) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
Age <45 –0.049 –0.010 0.025 –0.029
(0.031) (0.055) (0.054) (0.059)
AFI <$50,000 0.021 –0.005 –0.028 0.011
(0.056) (0.073) (0.064) (0.078)
Black or Hispanic –0.051 –0.036 0.022 0.129
(0.045) (0.081) (0.081) (0.099)
College degree –0.027 –0.101* –0.047 –0.165***
(0.036) (0.058) (0.055) (0.058)
Constant 0.120* 0.277*** 0.200** 0.373***
(0.063) (0.103) (0.100) (0.084)
N 478 478 478 478
R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06
Note : See Table 9.2.
Source : Authors’ computations, using the American Life Panel 2009.
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most financially literate are more likely to take up advice, as proposed by
Hackethal et al. (2012), differences in observed behavior may overstate this
impact. Controlling for selection on observables using only formal educa-
tion and experience as proxy variables for financial literacy may not
adequately resolve this problem, as Dominitz et al. (2008) show that finan-
cial literacy has strong effects independent of both. Hackethal et al. (2012)
go further by using an instrumental variables strategy to overcome this
issue. In our study, we use measures of financial literacy to explicitly control
for selection of this type, which is a major advantage. Our results suggest
that self-selection on financial literacy plays no significant role.
To illustrate this, we first re-estimate the LP model from Table 9.2, but
now we add financial literacy as an additional regressor (albeit on the
smaller sample for which the financial literacy measure is available). Results
in Table 9.5 provide no evidence of positive selection on financial literacy.
Although having lower financial literacy is somewhat related to advice-
seeking, the estimated relationship is very small and not significantly pre-
dictive. This is true of both measured financial literacy and self-assessed
financial literacy. Further non-parametric analysis using a Lowess curve
smoother shows a somewhat negative relationship between measured
financial literacy and advice-seeking but the result is highly skewed by a
few outliers; there is no discernible trend in the relationship between self-
assessed financial literacy and advice-seeking. Consistent with this, re-esti-
mating Equation (9.1) while controlling for financial literacy7 in the regres-
sions of behavioral outcomes on advice has little effect on the estimated
coefficients, be they reported allocations or investment mistakes. Again,
this result is robust to the use of both measured financial literacy and self-
assessed financial literacy.
Discussion: potential reverse causality and
selection on other unobservables
Our results show that although individuals believe that advice is important
for investing, there appears to be no systematic, statistically significant
relationship between advice and observed investment behavior. Moreover,
individuals who consulted advisors were more likely to have reduced their
contribution levels and were also more likely to continue making contribu-
tions. This apparently contradictory pattern of behavior suggests the pres-
ence of reverse causality: individuals who experienced unusual stress and
negative plan performance may have turned to advisors.
To explore this possibility, we also examined year-end plan balances in
2008 as well as net changes in plan balances between 2007 and 2008. Our
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Table 9.5 Portfolio allocations and financial literacy: ordinary least squares
estimates for current DC planholders
Panel A. Reported portfolio allocations and financial literacy
(current DC planholders)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stocks Bonds Money market Other
Demographic controls only
Consulted advisor in 2008 0.692 2.285 –2.519 –0.016
(6.948) (4.125) (4.808) (0.045)
Financial literacy controls:
Specification I:
Consulted advisor in 2008 0.639 2.285 –2.463 0.639
(6.938) (4.122) (4.790) (6.938)
Measured financial literacy –1.313 0.004 1.379 –1.313
(3.773) (2.486) (3.531) (3.773)
Specification II:
Consulted advisor in 2008 0.756 2.299 –2.567 –0.017
(6.920) (4.096) (4.797) (0.045)
Self-assessed financial literacy 1.086 0.245 –0.807 –0.010
(3.365) (2.008) (2.487) (0.025)
Panel B. ‘Mistakes’ in reported portfolio allocations and financial literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zero
equity
Under-
diversified
Too
aggressive
Too
conservative
Demographic controls only
Consulted advisor in 2008 –0.016 –0.025 –0.024 –0.027
(0.045) (0.088) (0.090) (0.094)
Financial literacy controls:
Specification I:
Consulted advisor in 2008 –0.015 –0.027 –0.028 –0.028
(0.045) (0.088) (0.089) (0.094)
Measured financial literacy 0.039 –0.055 –0.103** –0.024
(0.037) (0.053) (0.046) (0.050)
Specification II:
Consulted advisor in 2008 –0.017 –0.027 –0.026 –0.029
(0.045) (0.086) (0.088) (0.094)
Self-assessed financial literacy –0.010 –0.046 –0.035 –0.033
(0.025) (0.045) (0.046) (0.041)
N 360 360 360 360
Note: Other demographic controls are also included but estimates not shown. See also Table 9.2.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the American Life Panel 2009.
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results (not detailed here) show that, indeed, individuals who experienced
net plan losses were more likely to consult advisors, but that even account-
ing for financial literacy and income levels, consulting an advisor in 2008
had a marginally significant and positive effect on overall plan balances
(and the point estimate is sizable). This reinforces the possibility that
seeking advice may actually ultimately help in preserving wealth, but nega-
tive events tend to influence advice-seeking (rather than vice versa).
Another complication in establishing causality between advice and
behavior is the possibility of selection on a wide variety of unobservable
factors other than financial literacy. ALP respondents report diverse
reasons for not consulting an advisor (individuals were allowed to indicate
only one response). Thirty-seven percent of individuals felt they could
make their own decisions (in other words, saw themselves as financially
literate enough to forego advice), while 39 percent also cited the availabil-
ity of various substitutes for professional advice, either from friends or
family or other sources such as the Internet. A significant minority (one-
quarter) did not do so because of financial constraints. This heterogeneity
is consistent with our previous results, in which financial literacy (or the
lack thereof) is correlated with advice-seeking but not an overwhelmingly
dominant explanatory factor.
Experimental evidence on advice and behavior
In the case of survey data, it is not possible for us to rule out either reverse
causality or selection on unobservables.8 Without a plausibly exogenous
and predictive source of variation in advice-seeking and given the issues
described above, we cannot cleanly identify the causal impact of receiving
advice on behavior. We therefore turn to an experimental analysis of advice
and behavior. Given the focus on investment advice uncovered in the
survey data, our experiment was designed to test the effect of receiving
investment advice on portfolio allocation. While we are restricted to an
analysis of hypothetical outcomes, we do have two key advantages: the
advice provided is uniform, and reverse causality cannot arise. We designed
a multi-stage randomized experiment in which participants were presented
with a hypothetical portfolio allocation task. Participants were presented
with six investment options: a money market fund, a bond market index
fund, an S&P 500 index fund, a small cap value index fund, a REIT index
fund, and a global equity index fund. Participants received basic infor-
mation on the funds, namely fees and returns, and were then allocated a
hypothetical portfolio among the funds.
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Choice treatment: defaults and affirmative decisions
Participants were randomly assigned to either a control group or one of two
experimental conditions. In all conditions, participants were informed that
they would be asked to allocate an investment portfolio. The control group
received no further information or support before performing the task. In
one treatment, which we termed the default treatment, all participants
received advice regarding optimal portfolio allocation. In the other treat-
ment, the affirmative decision treatment, participants were given a choice and
received advice only if they asked for it. These experiments were designed
to allow us to study the effects of solicited versus unsolicited advice as well as
self-selection into advice.
Financial environment treatment: low/high past returns
Previous research has shown that individual investor responses are very
sensitive to reported past performance (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Zheng,
1999). To see whether advice can mitigate this sensitivity, we varied the
historical returns shown in the portfolio allocation task. For a randomly
selected half of all respondents (the low-returns treatment), we presented
returns for the various asset classes representative of typical fund perform-
ance over the last year, while in the other half (the high-returns treatment), we
presented returns representative of performance over the last five years,
which were significantly less negative.
Advice presentation
We presented advice about normatively desirable investing rules first pro-
posed by Mottola and Utkus (2009). These rules are based on commonly
accepted principles of investment as follows: (a) a zero balance in equities
is not recommended, (b) an equity balance of less than 40 percent is
considered overly conservative, (c) holding more than 95 percent equity
is considered overly aggressive, and (d) a portfolio that is 100 percent in a
single asset class may be under-diversified. In this analysis, we focus on the
general results of advice, rather than the format, although we note that half
the participants who received advice (whether by default or by choice)
randomly received the rules treatment, in which participants were presented
with the set of simple investing rules or guidelines in table form. The
remaining half was assigned to the portfolio checkup treatment. We designed
an interactive mechanism that provided feedback to participants after they
enter a suggested allocation. A Portfolio Checkup Tool evaluates the allo-
cation and compares it to the set of rules. A ‘Green’ signal was given if the
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portfolio did not violate any guidelines, while a ‘Yellow’ or ‘Red’ signal was
given if the portfolio’s allocation went against less or more stringent rules.
Figure 9.1 shows samples of the task description for the control group and
treatment groups.
Experimental sample and summary statistics
All 2,224 panel members of the ALP, regardless of plan status, were invited
to participate in the experiment; 2,070 respondents completed the experi-
ment. Table 9.6 shows the sample after accounting for missing responses,
as well as the demographic composition for the final sample. Note that for
the experimental analyses, we do not apply population weights to the
analyses. Figure 9.2 shows a full schematic representation of the random-
ized experiment and probability of assignment for each treatment group.9
For the present analysis, we focus attention on the choice treatments,10 and
a discussion of the other randomized treatments is held for future work. As
a check on the randomization, we tabulated the number of individuals and
summary statistics for the sample of the choice treatment groups, to iden-
tify any remaining differences across groups that need to be acknowledged
and accounted for in later analysis. Results suggest that the randomization
achieves a reasonable balance across the treatment groups in terms of
observables, with two possible exceptions: firstly, a skew toward younger
individuals in the ‘affirmative decision’ treatment versus the ‘default’ treat-
ment and second, a skew toward DC plan enrollees in the control treatment
versus the advice treatments. We therefore include appropriate demo-
graphic controls in our multivariate regression analysis.
Who chooses advice? Self-selection and financial literacy
About 65 percent of individuals in the ‘affirmative decision’ treatment
group elected to receive advice. Accordingly, two observations are worth
noting: first, not all individuals chose to receive advice and second, individ-
uals did not appear to be randomly choosing to receive advice or not (as
50 percent lies outside the 95 percent confidence interval). The relative
demographic composition of those who did solicit advice is quite different
from those who did not. In the ‘affirmative decision’ treatment, there were
clear and significant differences along age and wealth—those who chose
advice were more likely to be older and wealthier than those who did not.
For the subsample with financial literacy data, we also test for differences
on financial literacy. Unlike the observational data, however, the bottom
panel of Table 9.6 also shows strong evidence of selection on financial
literacy. Those who chose advice were significantly less financially literate.
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Figure 9.1 Survey questions of ALP modules: Panel A. Screen shot of task descrip-
tion: high returns + affirmative decision advice treatment; Panel B. Screen shot of
task: rules treatment; Panel C. Screen shot of task: portfolio checkup treatment
Source: RAND American Life Panel.
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Interestingly, the difference is more statistically significant for self-assessed
financial literacy, rather than measured financial literacy.
Table 9.7 reports the determinants of the probability of advice-seeking
for the ‘affirmative decision’ group estimated using the LP model used in
Table 9.2. Column 1 includes as regressors the demographic characteristics
from the survey data analysis, as well as an indicator for having a DC plan
and an indicator for being in the low-returns treatment as these may inde-
pendently affect the propensity to seek advice. Columns 2 and 3 add the
financial literacy measures. Our results show that the age effect on the
propensity to seek advice becomes insignificant once we account for finan-
cial literacy, but the wealth effect remains significant. This is remarkable, as
the advice is free and the incentives for the hypothetical task have no
relationship to actual wealth. We also note that financial literacy is strongly
significant (regardless of whether measured or self-assessed financial literacy
is used) regardless of the other demographic controls. Nevertheless, the
relatively low fit indicates that a large amount of the variation in advice-
seeking in the experiment is still not explained by observable characteristics,
even with the inclusion of the financial literacy measures.
Figure 9.1 Continued
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The impact of advice on behavior
Having established that in the absence of reverse causality and financial
constraints, negative self-selection on financial literacy is likely to occur,
we next move on to analyze the impact of advice on investment behav-
ior. Our next goals are to (a) establish whether advice itself has an
effect, (b) understand if investors are likely to behave differently toward
advice when it is presented as an affirmative choice rather than as a
default, and (c) gain insight into the relative importance of selection
versus the actual impact of advice in observed real-world behavior, where
advice is typically a choice variable. These questions are of first-order
importance when considering the likely impact of policy alternatives
such as making advice more freely available, or instituting compulsory
financial counseling.
Table 9.6 Summary statistics on the ALP experimental sample
Unweighted %
Married 66.5
Female 57.3
Age <45 31.8
AFI <$50,000 39.2
Black or Hispanic 9.5
College degree 45.2
Currently enrolled in employer DC plan 29.0
Affirmative
decision:
chose
advice (%)
N Affirmative
decision:
chose no
advice (%)
N t-test of
equality
(p-value)
Default
group
(unsolicited
advice) (%)
N
Married 70.26 548 65.76 295 0.18 65.29 801
Female 59.49 548 54.58 295 0.17 57.80 801
Age <45 30.66 548 40.68 295 0.00*** 30.34 801
AFI <$50,000 33.39 548 42.71 295 0.01** 41.32 801
Black or Hispanic 8.94 548 10.17 295 0.56 10.36 801
College degree 45.26 548 43.73 295 0.67 46.82 801
Currently enrolled
in employer DC plan
31.39 548 27.46 295 0.24 26.09 801
Measured financial
literacy
0.23 406 0.36 178 0.09* 0.24 569
Self-assessed
financial literacy
2.64 406 2.99 178 0.00*** 2.66 569
Note: See Table 9.2.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the American Life Panel 2009. See text.
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The average effect of default versus optional advice on behavior
With the randomized controlled trial design, we obtain unbiased estimates
of the effects of a treatment by simply comparing mean outcomes of
interest between treatment and control groups. We first describe respond-
ents’ portfolio allocations as well as the investment ‘mistakes’ explicitly
addressed by the rules, comparing both the default treatment group
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Figure 9.2 Experimental design schematic
Source: Authors’ formulation; see text.
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(with unsolicited advice) and the affirmative decision group (where advice
is optional), to the control group (with no advice). For each treatment
group, we test the hypotheses that the group sample means are equal to the
sample mean of the control (i.e., there is zero treatment effect for that
group). Note that for the affirmative decision group, the mean includes
outcomes for individuals who both chose and did not choose advice. The
difference between treatment and control thus reflects the overall effect of
being administered the affirmative decision treatment, regardless of the
actual choice.
Table 9.8 shows clearly that the mean values of all outcomes for the
default group are not significantly different from the control group.
Unsolicited advice, it appears, may have no effect on behavior. In the
affirmative decision group, on the other hand, we find that respondents
are significantly less likely to commit two ‘mistakes’—under-diversification
and being too conservative. This implies that the affirmative decision
Table 9.7 Determinants of the propensity to seek advice: affirmative decision
treatment (ordinary least squares estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Married 0.030 0.008 0.017
(0.038) (0.045) (0.045)
Female 0.065* 0.025 –0.007
(0.034) (0.041) (0.041)
Age <45 –0.104*** –0.031 –0.038
(0.035) (0.046) (0.045)
AFI <$50,000 –0.077** –0.092* –0.092**
(0.039) (0.047) (0.046)
Black or Hispanic 0.010 –0.020 –0.016
(0.058) (0.071) (0.071)
College degree –0.005 –0.057 –0.025
(0.034) (0.043) (0.042)
Has DC plan 0.036 0.054 0.064
(0.037) (0.043) (0.042)
Low-returns treatment –0.007 0.032 0.029
(0.033) (0.038) (0.038)
Measured financial literacy index –0.045*
(0.027)
Self-assessed financial literacy index –0.089***
(0.022)
Constant 0.650*** 0.723*** 0.952***
(0.053) (0.061) (0.084)
N 843 584 584
R2 0.02 0.02 0.05
Note : See Table 9.2.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the American Life Panel 2009. See text.
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treatment has a positive average effect on behavior for the group as a
whole.
In light of the slightly differing demographic composition between the
treatment groups, we run an OLS regression on the whole sample to
estimate the following equation:
Table 9.8 Experimental results: comparisons of means
Sample means t-test of equality of means (p-value)
Control
(no
advice %)
Default group
(unsolicited
advice %)
Affirmative decision
group (optional
advice %)
Default
=
control
Affirmative
decision =
control
% Allocation
Stocks 25.6 25.2 28.1 0.81 0.12
Bonds 29.9 29.9 29.3 0.97 0.65
Money
market
38.2 39.2 37.1 0.54 0.48
Other 5.9 5.7 5.5 0.31 0.17
Mistakes
Zero equity 37.6 37.1 34.1 0.87 0.22
Under-
diversified
13.2 10.4 9.6 0.14 0.06*
Too
aggressive
1.4 1.5 1.7 0.90 0.73
Too
conservative
65.5 65.3 59.6 0.94 0.04**
Sample means t-test of equality of means (p-value)
Chose
advice
(%)
Did not
choose
advice (%)
Chose advice = did
not choose advice
Chose
advice =
default
Did not choose
advice = control
% Allocation
Stocks 29.5 25.5 0.04** 0.00*** 0.96
Bonds 29.8 28.4 0.36 0.96 0.40
Money
market
34.5 41.9 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.11
Other 6.2 4.3 0.00*** 0.28 0.00***
Mistakes
Zero equity 27.6 46.1 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02**
Under-
diversified
4.4 19.3 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02**
Too
aggressive
1.1 2.7 0.08 0.53 0.21
Too
conservative
56.2 65.8 0.01** 0.00*** 0.94
Note : See Table 9.2.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the American Life Panel 2009. See text.
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Yi ¼ aþ bd defaulti þ ba affirmativei þ X 0i dþ e; ð9:2Þ
where ‘default’ and ‘affirmative’ are now treatment dummies, and we
control for the observables vector X. In the terminology of program evalu-
ation, we can think of the default experimental group as being enrolled in
a compulsory program of free advice, and the affirmative decision group as
a group which is enrolled in a program which simply offers advice for free.
The b coefficients give the treatment effects of being exposed to the
program, or the intent-to-treat estimate (which for mandatory, full-compliance
programs similar to the default treatment is the same as the actual program
effect).
Table 9.9 shows the results on portfolio quality using the ‘mistake’ indi-
cators as outcome variables. The default treatment has no significant effect,
Table 9.9 Intent-to-treat effects on portfolio quality: all choice treatments
(ordinary least squares estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zero
equity
Under-
diversified
Too
aggressive
Too
conservative
Default treatment –0.000 –0.026 0.002 –0.002
(0.029) (0.018) (0.007) (0.028)
Affirmative decision treatment –0.030 –0.034* 0.002 –0.056**
(0.028) (0.018) (0.007) (0.028)
Married –0.012 0.001 –0.003 0.005
(0.024) (0.015) (0.006) (0.024)
Female 0.072*** –0.002 –0.005 0.100***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.006) (0.021)
Age <45 –0.044* 0.000 0.014** –0.096***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.006) (0.023)
AFI <$50,000 0.062** 0.010 –0.008 0.049**
(0.024) (0.016) (0.006) (0.024)
Black or Hispanic –0.064* –0.012 –0.007 –0.032
(0.036) (0.024) (0.009) (0.036)
College degree –0.070*** –0.027* –0.006 –0.041*
(0.022) (0.014) (0.006) (0.022)
Has DC plan –0.058*** 0.042*** 0.008 –0.102***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.005) (0.021)
Low-returns treatment –0.001 0.028* 0.016*** –0.060**
(0.024) (0.015) (0.006) (0.024)
Constant 0.394*** 0.112*** 0.012 0.694***
(0.039) (0.025) (0.010) (0.039)
N 2,070 2,070 2,070 2,070
R2 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05
Note : See Table 9.2.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the American Life Panel 2009. See text.
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while the previously noted affirmative decision treatment effects are robust
to the inclusion of the demographic controls as well as controls for DC plan
ownership and the low-returns treatment. For the subsample of individuals
with financial literacy data, we also re-estimate Equation (9.2) using both
measured and self-assessed financial literacy measures. When we control
for financial literacy, we find that the overall effects in the affirmative
decision are reduced, but there is still a positive and significant effect in
reducing over-conservatism. More generally, in line with the message of the
advice, we find that individuals who follow advice should allocate a signifi-
cant part of their portfolio to stocks, but not more than 95 percent.
Additional regression analysis shows there is no significant average effect
on stockholding in either treatment, although the point estimates are
consistently positive for the affirmative decision treatment and negative
for the default treatment, whether or not we control for financial literacy.11
These results establish that unsolicited advice has no average effect, but
that offering advice as a choice may indeed positively affect overall invest-
ment behavior. In the default treatment group, we explore the possibility
of heterogeneous treatment effects that might justify the provision of
advice even when it is not asked for. In the affirmative decision group,
we next turn to the estimation of the actual effects of treatment on the
treated, and analyze the implications of self-selection on other unobserv-
able characteristics.
Are there heterogeneous treatment effects in the default treatment group?
Although in the default group, we find no strong average effects, it is
reasonable to speculate that perhaps there are smaller subgroups of inter-
est that do respond to such unsolicited advice and that may be targeted
separately. In particular, policymakers may consider targeting such inter-
ventions to groups of individuals that have lower skills. One conclusion
from the survey results might well be that, since the less financially literate
are not seeking out advice on their own for reasons that may include
financial constraints, and may also be prone to making mistakes, giving
free advice as a default may help them. Our results show some support for
this idea, but the evidence is not strong.
We focus on individuals in the default and control groups and we re-
estimate Equation (9.2) with the default treatment dummy interacted with
a measure that reflects skill levels (college education, age, or the financial
literacy measures). In this specification, a significant coefficient on the
interaction term suggests a differential (additive) treatment effect for
that group. For this analysis, we characterize individuals who lie below the
median value for each financial index as having ‘low financial literacy’ in
order to generate an indicator of low financial literacy. Results show no
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clear trends: there are statistically significant differential impacts for the
young or the less financially literate, although the point estimates suggest
that giving out advice has a salutary impact on the less-financially literate
respondents across all the portfolio quality metrics. Overall, however, in
the default group, there is no overwhelming compelling case for making
free counseling compulsory (we note however other studies, such as Hast-
ings and Mitchell (2011), suggest that altering the format of advice can
make a difference in low-literacy groups: the interactive portfolio meter
treatment can have a greater effect than the non-interactive rules
treatment).
Treatment effects vs. selection in the affirmative decision group
Within the affirmative decision group, we find extremely large behavioral
differences between those who choose to receive advice and those who do
not, implying that both treatment effects and selection are present. Our
previous results rule out the most immediately intuitive type of selection,
positive selection on financial literacy. Instead, the findings point to self-
selection on other unobservables such as motivation or interest. At the
same time, in line with the intent-to-treat analysis above, we also find
positive average treatment effects on the treated—the advice itself does
alter the behavior of the recipients. Yet the magnitude of the actual impact
is small relative to the difference due to self-selection on unobservables,
which serves as a cautionary note for those evaluating such programs with
observational data alone.
Returning to the main results in Table 9.8, we find that recipients and
non-recipients in the affirmative decision group differ significantly with
respect to portfolio allocation and portfolio quality. On all four quality
metrics, advice recipients perform significantly better than non-recipients:
they are less likely to hold zero equity, be under-diversified, or rated as too
conservative. Recipients are also not simply increasing risk exposure across
the board, as they are also less likely to be too aggressive. While advice
recipients in the affirmative decision group outperform advice recipients
in the default group, those who do not receive advice do worse or no
different compared to the control group (who also received no advice).
The latter observation implies that some of these differences may be due to
self-selection along some dimension that also influences task performance.
One way to explain the better performance by advice recipients might be
that individuals who are more financially literate are also more likely to
seek advice, but our earlier analysis shows that advice recipients self-select
negatively on financial literacy. In the absence of any advice effect, if
financial literacy was the primary source of selection, we would expect
advice recipients to perform worse, not better, on the task. We therefore
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re-estimate Equation (9.1) using only the affirmative decision treatment
group with a control vector that includes and excludes financial literacy
measures. For portfolio quality metrics, we find a large significant associ-
ation between better performance and advice, which is robust to the vector
of regular demographics as well as the inclusion of either measure of
financial literacy (Table 9.10).
If we assume that this set of controls resolves the selection problem, our
estimates would imply very large effects of advice on behavior. Thus,
individuals who choose to receive advice are about 18–25 percent less likely
to have zero equities in their portfolios, or to be under-diversified. They are
also about 10 percent less likely to be over-conservative, a result which
contrasts dramatically to the zero effect of delivering the same advice
automatically. However, we cannot rule out selection on other unobserv-
able characteristics. To try to understand how much of this association is
likely due to selection effects, we next estimate the average impact of
treatment on the treated and compare it to these differences in behavior.
We note that the analysis in the preceding section implies that the advice
does indeed have an effect, although it remains to be seen whether this
effect can explain the whole observed difference. If advice had no impact
Table 9.10 Portfolio quality, advice, and financial literacy: affirmative decision
treatment (ordinary least squares estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zero
equity
Under-
diversified
Too
aggressive
Too
conservative
Demographic controls only
Chose advice 0.227*** 0.169*** 0.022** 0.108**
(0.041) (0.025) (0.010) (0.043)
Financial literacy added:
Specification I:
Chose advice 0.237*** 0.174*** 0.022** 0.118***
(0.041) (0.025) (0.011) (0.043)
Measured financial literacy 0.089*** 0.047*** 0.003 0.095***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.007) (0.028)
Specification II:
Chose advice 0.262*** 0.182*** 0.020* 0.139***
(0.041) (0.025) (0.011) (0.043)
Self-assessed financial 0.112*** 0.041*** 0.006 0.100***
literacy (0.022) (0.013) (0.006) (0.023)
N 584 584 584 584
Note : Other demographics from Table 9.9 included but not shown. See Table 9.2.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the American Life Panel 2009. See text.
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on behavior for anyone in both groups but simply acted as a sorting device,
we would expect on average behavior in both the (randomly assigned)
affirmative decision and control groups to be equal. Yet the significant
intent-to-treat effect implies that, on average, the affirmative decision
group is either less or equally likely to commit mistakes than the control
group.
The intent-to-treat estimate is simply the average effect of treatment for
the whole affirmative decision group; it therefore pools together both
individuals who received and did not receive advice. We are interested in
the average effect of treatment on the treated, or the effect of advice on
those who actually took it up. An estimate of the average effect of treatment
on the treated is simply the intent-to-treat estimate divided by the actual
take-up rate, or, in this case, the average treatment effect for the whole
affirmative decision group, divided by the fraction of respondents in the
group who chose advice. In a multivariate regression framework, this is
equivalent to re-estimating Equation (9.1) using instrumental variables
regression on both treatment and controls, where assignment to the treat-
ment group is the instrumental variable.
Results in Table 9.11 (with and without financial literacy) are relatively
modest. In this case, an individual who chooses advice is 8–9 percent less
Table 9.11 Estimates of the average effect of treatment on those treated on portfolio
quality andfinancial literacy: affirmativedecision treatment vs. controls (IV regression:
instrument for advice = assignment to affirmative decision treatment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zero
equity
Under-
diversified
Too
aggressive
Too
conservative
Demographic controls only
Chose advice 0.055 0.036 0.002 0.092*
(0.047) (0.029) (0.012) (0.048)
Financial literacy added:
Specification I:
Chose advice 0.058 0.038 0.002 0.095**
(0.047) (0.029) (0.012) (0.047)
Measured financial literacy 0.099*** 0.049*** 0.003 0.120***
(0.022) (0.014) (0.006) (0.022)
Specification II:
Chose advice 0.047 0.033 0.002 0.083*
(0.046) (0.029) (0.012) (0.047)
Self-assessed financial literacy 0.101*** 0.036*** 0.006 0.105***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018)
N 897 897 897 897
Note : Other demographics in Table 9.9 included but not shown. See Table 9.2.
Source : Authors’ calculations using the American Life Panel 2009. See text.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
206 The Market for Retirement Financial Advice
likely to be over-conservative, but other effects are far more muted: the
effects on under-diversification range from being 5 percent less likely to
nothing significant across the various specifications. Compared to the
estimates in Table 9.10, the magnitude of the actual treatment effects
suggests that a sizable part of the gap between advice recipients and non--
recipients is due to self-selection, and that this selection occurs on perform-
ance-related unobservables other than financial literacy.
Conclusion
Using experimental methods to try to better understand the causal rela-
tionship between advice and behavior, we report on a hypothetical choice
experiment in which participants are asked to perform a portfolio alloca-
tion task. This means we can only analyze hypothetical outcomes rather
than real plan outcomes, but there are several advantages to the experi-
mental analysis. First, the advice provided is completely uniform in con-
tent. Second, the issue of reverse causality does not arise. Respondents are
randomly assigned to one of three study arms. The first arm is a control
group, in which the task is presented to respondents without any advice.
Respondents in the second arm, the default treatment group, all receive the
same financial advice. In the third arm, the affirmative decision group,
respondents are given the choice of whether to receive the advice. Only
those who choose advice receive it. Comparing the three groups allows us
to study the effects of advice given as matter of course, versus the effects of
advice given as a result of requiring an active rather than a passive decision.
Results demonstrate that unsolicited advice has no effect on investment
behavior: in terms of behavioral outcomes, individuals who are simply
given advice disregard it almost completely. When advice is optional,
individuals with low financial literacy are more likely to seek it out. In
spite of this negative selection on ability, individuals who actively solicit
advice do perform better. Solicited advice thus appears to have more of an
effect than unsolicited advice, although the magnitude of self-selection
effects can overshadow actual treatment effects.
In some situations, policymakers may find mandatory counseling an
attractive remedy. Our results suggest this is not likely to work, however,
if the target population is not inherently prepared to take advice, even if it
is truly lacking necessary skills. We do know that when employers offer
advice as an elective benefit and ensuring employees’ active decision-
making, this can result in significant take-up and some improvement of
financial outcomes, and employees with low financial literacy are more
likely to take advantage of these programs. At the same time, policymakers
should be realistic about the effects of such programs. One cannot
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overestimate the impact of voluntary advice programs, since observed
differences between recipients and non-recipients are likely to be influ-
enced by selection. Ex-post evaluations are particularly likely to be subject
to such biases, even when researchers have access to data on seemingly key
variables such as financial skills and education.
Our findings point to a challenging problem. Building financial literacy
can improve outcomes, but other unobservable factors such as inherent
motivation are also highly performance-relevant and do not appear to be
not perfectly correlated with financial ability. Hence, if motivation and
other underlying factors remain unaffected, increased advice and other
support tools may not only raise average outcomes but also increase the
disparities between individuals who are self-motivated and those who are
not. Accordingly, transitioning from knowledge to actual behavior change
requires advice and educational materials designed to engage rather than
simply inform the consumer. Future work will investigate whether an
engaging presentation format in addition to knowledge content can inde-
pendently promote behavioral change.
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Endnotes
1. Their approach is similar in spirit to Calvet et al. (2007), who assess the welfare
costs of household investment ‘mistakes’ in Sweden, focusing on under-diversifi-
cation of risky assets and non-participation in risky asset markets.
2. The ALP is an Internet panel of respondents aged 18 and over. Respondents in
the panel either use their own computer to log on to the Internet or a Web TV,
which allows them to access the Internet using their television and a telephone
line. The technology allows respondents who did not have previous Internet
access to participate in the panel. ALP members are recruited from among
individuals aged 18 and older who respond to the monthly Survey of Consumers
conducted by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center. The monthly
survey produces, among other measures, the widely used Index of Consumer
Sentiment and Index of Consumer Expectations. On joining, respondents to the
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ALP complete a separate survey about individual demographic, work history, and
other household information, which they are prompted to update each time
they log in to a new module. This provides a series of self-reported demographic
characteristics of interest, including birth date, gender, education, ethnicity,
occupation, state of residence, and income. The ALP population as a whole
tends to have more education and income than the broader US population;
there are twomain reasons for this sample selection. First, the Michigan respond-
ents tend to have more education than the population at large, as described by
Census data. Second, the great majority of ALPmembers have their own Internet
access. Americans with Internet access tend to have more education and income
than the broader population. As such, for survey data analysis, we apply popula-
tion weights to all survey response. For the experimental data analysis, the data
remain unweighted.
3. It should be noted that twenty-five respondents were erroneously omitted from
the survey sample for the question about advice received in 2008; in addition,
three individuals gave no response. The maximum and minimum possible
bounds for the true full-sample statistic are 17–22 percent, computed using the
extreme assumptions of 0–100 percent take-up for the omitted group. We note
that the low overall use of advice for the rest of the sample suggests that the true
sample mean is likely to be at the lower end of this range.
4. Throughout this chapter, we use linear probability models for simplicity. In
robustness checks, probit regressions delivered qualitatively and quantitatively
similar results.
5. We also note that of the forty-one individuals reporting making early withdraw-
als, seven did not report their contributions activity. However, only two individ-
uals reported also stopping their contributions, and five individuals made lower
contributions. On the other hand, twenty-three individuals report continuing
the same (positive) average contribution from the previous year, and five people
actually increased their contribution.
6. As individuals with missing data were in the group reporting early withdrawals,
the latter statistics are the most sensitive to assumptions about the missing values.
In the sample without missing data, individuals with advice were more likely to
report early withdrawals. Assuming the upper bound of one for all missing, this is
clearly even more pronounced; assuming a lower bound of zero for all missing,
we find that, unsurprisingly, this result is reversed. While no conclusive inference
can be made, given that prevalence of advice in the group of early withdrawals
without missing data is close to the sample average, true early withdrawal behav-
ior is not likely to be very different across those with and without advisors.
7. A detailed analysis of the impact of financial literacy itself on these and other
related outcomes is found in Hung et al. (2009).
8. In their study of German investors, Hackethal et al. (2012) used an instrumental
variables strategy to identify the impact of advice, employing regional statistics
for number of bank branches per capita, voter participation, log income, and
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fraction of population with a college degree as instruments for use of a financial
advisor. As ALP respondents report their current state of residence, we col-
lected analogous data for the United States and replicated this strategy using
state-level averages for the number of financial advisors per capita in 2005–6,
log 2006 median income, the fraction of population above age 25 with a college
degree in 2009, and voter participation rates for the 2008 general election.
However, the first-stage regression (not reported here) with these instruments
is extremely weak (F-statistic < 2). We conclude that in the United States, unlike
Germany, local geographical variation in the supply of advisors is not a strong
predictor for advice-seeking, and that instrumental variables regression is not a
valid strategy.
9. We drop 16 observations in which the individuals did not complete the survey
and a further 138 responses which were missing or invalid. Cross-tabulations
and chi-squared tests indicate that the missing responses are not correlated with
the choice treatments.
10. The randomization for the other treatments is conducted orthogonally, and so
it should not affect the results of the analysis which essentially compares means
across this set of randomized treatments.
11. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of equality of distributions does not reject the null
of no difference between default and control (p = 0.996). It also does not reject
the null of no difference between affirmative decision and control (p = 0.144),
but this result is considerably more marginal. As an aside, both financial literacy
measures strongly and significantly predict behavior independent of the treat-
ments, in a direction consistent with the advice: the more literate are more
likely to hold stock and less likely to commit mistakes.
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